UKRAINE: The State clashing with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church/ Moscow Patriarchate: Exploring possible solutions
Original title of the article: Legislative ban on the UOC as a chance for reconciliation among Orthodox Churches in Ukraine
by Sergii Bortnyk, Professor of the Kyiv theological academy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
Orthodox Times (28.08.2024) – Recent weeks have been quite intense in Ukraine’s religious sphere. Undoubtedly, the most resonant event was the adoption of Bill No. 8371 by the Ukrainian Parliament on August 20. In its latest version, it was titled “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations,” but it is informally known as the “law banning the UOC (Ukrainian Orthodox Church).”
The bill’s adoption was demanded by a significant number of opposition deputies, particularly from the “European Solidarity” party, led by former President Petro Poroshenko, who played a pivotal role in the establishment of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2019.
On July 23, 2024, several deputies even blocked the parliament’s podium because, without the votes from the “Servant of the People” faction, it was impossible to add the bill to the agenda. Consequently, the parliament took a four-week break in sessional meetings to finalize the bill in a form acceptable to the majority of deputies.
By the day of voting, support had grown sufficiently—175 “servants” (out of a total of 235) voted in favor. This constituted the lion’s share of votes supporting the bill, as deputies from all other factions combined contributed only 92 votes “in favor,” with a total of 267 deputies supporting the bill out of the 226 minimum required.
At this stage, it is worth noting that the opposition demanded the bill’s adoption, while the majority of votes came from the ruling party.
Such support from “Servant of the People” was not surprising, given President Zelensky’s course toward “spiritual independence,” closely tied to this party. His religious policy changed in the fall of 2022, marked by the appointment of Viktor Yelensky as the new head of the state body responsible for religious matters – the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience (“DESS”). Zelensky’s expression “spiritual independence” was used both before and after the adoption of the “law banning the UOC,” likely encouraging deputies to make a positive decision.
The UOC is not explicitly named in the document, but the seven criteria for “affiliation” (formulated as amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”) leave no doubt that it is referring to the UOC in a veiled manner.
One criterion concerns “the appointment, election, approval, blessing of the head of a religious organization operating in Ukraine” or “the approval of the charter of a religious organization operating in Ukraine.” According to the ROC’s charter, when electing a new primate of the UOC and approving changes to its charter, such approval from the Moscow Patriarchate is required.
Another formulation of such “affiliation” is “subordination in canonical and/or organizational matters” to a foreign religious organization that “has the ability to influence management decisions.” Although these terms are placed together, the distinction between canonical and organizational matters is crucial for further considerations.
The official representatives of the UOC argue that they severed ties with the Russian Church at the Council in May 2022 in Feofaniya near Kyiv, although they did not proclaim autocephaly. The Council’s resolution formulated this as “full independence and autonomy.”
Critics of this UOC position argue that the UOC did not become a new local church after the Council and remains canonically a part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
UOC representatives assert that they have severed administrative subordination (and have not followed any orders or recommendations from church authorities in Moscow for over two years).
It should be noted that state intervention in purely ecclesiastical matters (such as the issue of canonical subordination of the UOC to the Moscow Patriarchate) goes beyond the state’s competence since, according to Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Church is separated from the state.
From the UOC’s perspective, in the absence of any actions confirming its administrative (managerial) dependence on Moscow, it should not fall under this law’s purview. Obtaining canonical independence (in the form of establishing a new autocephalous church) is a complex procedure, not solely dependent on the UOC’s will; it lacks a clear algorithm recognized by all local Orthodox Churches worldwide.
It’s enough to mention that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has been recognized by only four out of fourteen local churches five years after receiving the Tomos of autocephaly. The Orthodox Church in America, even after 50 years, has not achieved general recognition of its autocephalous status and remains part of the Russian Church in the eyes of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and several other local churches, despite being granted autocephaly by the ROC in 1970.
The Council of Crete in 2016, planned as “pan-Orthodox,” could not adopt a document on the procedure for obtaining autocephaly by a new church, confirming the principle of conciliarity in making decisions about the emergence of a new local church. Therefore, the current norm is more of an agreement that the Ecumenical Church of Constantinople is authorized to grant autocephaly to a new church—after which this decision can be received by other local churches.
Similarly, Constantinople has the right to accept appeals from clergy of other local churches (now actively used in restoring the status of clergy banned in the ROC for their anti-war stance). In general, it can be assumed that Constantinople’s significance is gradually increasing in recent times to promote peace and resolve conflicts in the Orthodox world.
These powers of Constantinople are crucial today for resolving the Ukrainian issue.
The principle of oikonomia applied by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to clergy from non-canonical jurisdictions in Ukraine helped accept them “in their existing rank,” enabling the creation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) at the end of 2018. At that time, the UOC leadership denied such powers of Constantinople, calling it interference in the affairs of “another local church.”
Back then, strictly speaking, this “other” referred to the Moscow Patriarchate, while the territory of Ukraine was considered part of the canonical territory of the ROC. Today, I believe many UOC clergy and faithful would gladly agree to a canonical solution to break with the “leadership center in the aggressor country” that blesses the war against Ukraine (this is now a common legal description of the UOC’s connection with the Russian Church). However, the algorithm for achieving this is lacking. Therefore, recognizing the arbitrator’s authority in Constantinople and its willingness to help resolve the conflict among Orthodox Christians in Ukraine could assist the UOC in exiting its complex canonical situation.
The simplest solution, actively promoted by both state officials and activists, is breaking with the Moscow Patriarchate and joining the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which already has autocephalous status. For example, Viktor Yelensky, head of DESS, stated after the law banning the UOC was adopted that he could “create a model where no one would be humiliated, offended, winners, or losers, and everyone would keep their positions,” if Metropolitan Onufriy approached him.
However, this assumes that the UOC would join the OCU structure.
This option is also actively supported within the OCU: its leadership supports the legislative ban on the UOC and, concerning Constantinople’s powers, states: “We are grateful for your assistance in establishing the OCU, but now Ukraine is our canonical territory, and you have no right to interfere in our affairs.”
The problem is that this option is unacceptable to the UOC leadership. For them, the OCU remains a canonically incomplete structure with partially illegal ordinations of bishops and priests. Therefore, joining the OCU would be a retreat from fundamental principles of canonical order.
But is there an alternative that could help the UOC resolve its complex canonical situation using the same principle of oikonomia? I believe there is. It involves involving Constantinople in the necessary changes to the UOC’s canonical status. Importantly, the dialogue should not be between the UOC and the OCU, but between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
I see two important signs that this path is considered possible, especially by the Ukrainian government.
Firstly, there are active contacts with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In recent days, President Zelensky discussed the need for “spiritual independence” not only with the broad Ukrainian public but also personally with Patriarch Bartholomew—both before and after the law banning the UOC was adopted; both in personal meetings and in telephone conversations.
Several visits by Ukrainian officials to Constantinople took place in recent months, and on the eve of Independence Day, celebrated on August 24, a delegation of authorized hierarchs from Constantinople visited Ukraine and held several meetings with representatives of various Orthodox jurisdictions, including Metropolitan Onufriy and several UOC metropolitans who are part of the Synod, i.e., belonging to the upper echelon of power in the UOC.
Some biased Ukrainian media hastily proclaimed that this meeting was fruitless.
However, some foreign media that initially reprinted this description of the results quickly acknowledged its falsity, confirmed by direct participants. The mere fact of such a meeting after nearly six years of no official contacts between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the UOC’s willingness to continue this dialogue, is already a significant achievement.
The second sign of seeking a resolution to the UOC’s canonical status is found in the text of Bill No. 8371.
In the “Final and Transitional Provisions,” there is an important note regarding the timing of amendments to administrative justice, i.e., the beginning of legal proceedings against UOC structures—this is nine months. In the earlier stages of drafting the bill.
What can the Ecumenical Patriarchate do to avoid the legislative ban on the UOC, which, given the human rights issue, is already becoming a global scandal?
As is known, at the time of granting the Tomos of autocephaly, it was decided that Ukraine was no longer part of the Moscow Patriarchate’s territory—thus, Constantinople declared its right to take canonical actions to resolve the conflict. Earlier in this article, I mentioned the expansion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s powers and its recent reception—even in Ukraine, which rigorists consider to be exclusively the canonical territory of the current OCU. The principle of economia, previously applied during the creation of the OCU, allows Constantinople to intervene in the affairs of Orthodox believers in Ukraine if it serves the general good of the Church.
In recent days, in the context of the visit by the Constantinople delegation, critics of the UOC have repeatedly stated that Constantinople’s intervention is impossible, that granting a second Tomos of autocephaly for Orthodox Christians in Ukraine is absurd, etc. However, the welfare of the UOC, as one of the rather large Orthodox churches, albeit with such an ambiguous canonical status, gives the right to such intervention. This could be achieved through direct contact between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the UOC.
The minimum possible form would be granting the status of a temporary exarchate for those UOC parishes or dioceses that would finally want to break with the Moscow Patriarchate but are not ready to join the OCU. Ideally, if negotiations with the UOC leadership proceed constructively, this could be an opportunity for the latter to preserve its structure in Ukraine.
If negotiations do not go as desired, along with the introduction of a ban on the legal existence of the UOC as a unified structure, the establishment of a temporary exarchate (in fact, this could be an expansion of the powers of the already existing exarch, Bishop Michael of Comana) could become an opportunity for the patriotically inclined part of the UOC to finally, and with a clear conscience, renounce canonical subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate.
Is such a development possible? It’s hard to say. However, it is obvious that after such a prolonged and bloody war with Russia, which continues to this day, remaining part of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine is morally problematic. At its council in May 2022, the UOC already took an important step—breaking administrative subordination to its center in Moscow. The next step is to change its canonical status, which is impossible without the intervention of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Is it worth taking the risk to achieve this noble goal of seeking church reconciliation in Ukraine by granting a new canonical status to the UOC? The statistics definitely suggest so. After all, there is a significant difference between the perception of the situation in public consciousness and the actual statistics.
On the one hand, the perception of the UOC in Ukraine’s public consciousness is quite negative. According to a survey by the Razumkov Center conducted in November 2023, the majority of those who consider themselves Orthodox identified with the OCU (69.4%), while the share of support for the “UOC (Moscow Patriarchate)” was only 9.2%.
Three years earlier, according to a similar survey, the proportions were significantly different: 32.2% supported the OCU and 21.9% supported the UOC. That is, due to the war and the formation of civic consciousness, support for the UOC has become 7.5 times less than support for the OCU. However, it should be noted that this is more an assessment of the number of sympathizers of both jurisdictions, rather than their actual members.
Figures on actual membership are provided by state statistics. And here, one should remember the administrative pressure from local authorities and public opinion over the past years, which has already significantly influenced the numbers in favor of the OCU.
The most recent data is from January 1, 2024.
Despite the war and various forms of pressure, the UOC still surpasses the OCU in the total number of religious organizations. Overall, it included 10,919 organizations, while the OCU had 8,295 organizations.
If you look at the numbers by region, they are even more striking: the OCU surpasses the UOC in the number of parishes in only six regions of Ukraine, primarily in the western part of the country and especially in Galicia. The UOC, however, dominates in 18 regions.
In some frontline regions, the UOC surpasses the OCU by 3-4 times (Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv regions). Unfortunately, in the last two years, state statistics have ceased to publish data on the number of clergy, but it is known that the UOC has at least twice as many clergy as the OCU.
Given these statistics and the traditional position of Ukraine’s state leadership on the need to “return to the borders of 1991,” an unconditional ban and persecution of the UOC is more likely to harm national security than to benefit it.
Therefore, just as the previous president managed to obtain the Tomos of autocephaly for the OCU, there is hope for positive changes in the canonical status of the UOC in the near future. For various reasons, the UOC cannot achieve this on its own. But with the assistance, support, and encouragement from the Ukrainian state authorities and Constantinople as the highest arbiter in the Orthodox world, this hope does not seem illusory.
Footnote: The emphases in the text are HRWF’s