UKRAINE: The war, religious beliefs and conscientious objection: Orthodox (4)
Can Orthodox and Orthodox priests be mobilized?
By Willy Fautré, director of Human Rights Without Frontiers, with a Ukrainian lawyer
HRWF (16.07.2024) – The legislation of Ukraine protects the right to conscientious objection to military service for members of ten categories of religious minorities the beliefs and teachings of which forbid them from using or carrying weapons, killing people and/or being under the authority of the military.
Such teachings are not part of the doctrine of the main Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (OCU and UOC)*. Their members are therefore not eligible for conscientious objection to military service and access to alternative non-military service/ civil service.
Noteworthy is that alternative (non-military) service is introduced only in place of regular military service, which is not subject to conscription during martial law (Article 1(1) of Law No. 1975-XII; Article 1(4) of Law No. 2232-XII). There is however a vacuum in the Constitution (Article 35) and in the legislation both in wartime and during martial law about what to do and Article 23 of the Law “On Mobilization Training and Mobilization” is silent about it.
Can Orthodox priests be mobilized?
The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine (OCU and UOC) are not on the list of those religious organizations whose doctrines prohibit taking up arms in principle. Referring to the Holy Scriptures and the teachings of the Holy Fathers, they do not condone violence or murder but they have no position concerning the attitude their parishioners should have with regard to military service, a career in the army and their participation in wars.
The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine may bless the representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine but it is for the sincere fulfillment of their official duties. Unlike the Russian Orthodox Church whose Patriarch Kirill calls Russia’s aggression war on Ukraine a “holy war” and all Russians should participate in it, the heads of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine do not call the military defence war of their country a “holy war” and do not say it should be the duty of all Ukrainians to join the army and fight.
The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine allow military service and participation in hostilities for the laity. Concerning the possible issue of the conscription of clergymen for military service, their canons unequivocally prohibit it. They provide that they be defrocked in case they would decide so (Rule 83 of the Holy Appendix; Rule 7 of the Fourth Ecumenical Assembly) as they require the defrocking of clerics who have committed murder even for the purpose of self-defense (Rule 55 of the Holy Great). Orthodox priests are to serve the Church – and only the Church – which has its own mission and prohibitions, in particular about the use of force and the shedding of blood. Special vows are also made by the Orthodox monks.
The total number of priests of the largest religious denominations of Ukraine (OCU and UOC), including the UGCC (Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church of Greek Orthodox rite affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church) is now around 18,000. About half of them are in the UOC. However, if we remove priests over 60 years of age, as well as those who have a deferment (large families, those who care for a disabled relative, etc.), the number of UOC clerics possibly subject to mobilization would be at most 3000 people in case the law would make clergymen eligible for mobilization.
It should be noted that the current rules about the possible conscription exemption for some categories of Ukrainian citizens during martial law, such as clergymen or university professors, as defined by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and as amended on 6 June 2024, did not meet the expectations of the clergy. The debates are going on.
At the same time, it seems the Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs) have already begun to mobilize individual priests of the UOC for military service. As Deacon Andrei Glushchenko notes: “I know a number of cases of mobilization of UOC priests, including a number of them I personally know. As far as I know, they completely agree to performing military service, with the exception of only one thing, which is direct participation in hostilities and killing enemy soldiers, although commanders are trying to force them to do so. On the other hand, I am still not aware of a single case of mobilization of priests of the OCU or the UGCC. At the front, they usually serve as chaplains.”
The military chaplaincy service is based on a contract and is another form of relations between the church and the army but it is considered a spiritual and moral assistance to the believers of various faiths. Chaplains have the status of servicemen, they are not combatants.
The case of Volodymyr Uhal, a parishioner of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
24.10.2023 Case No. 307/388/23 – Tyachiv, Tyachiv District Court of Transcarpathian Oblast – Guilty verdict. The punishment is 4 years in prison with release from the actual serving of the sentence with a probation period of 3 years.
The defendant, born in 1992, testified in court that on the feast of Epiphany on 19 January 2023 at 6 o’clock in the morning he was stopped by the police at a checkpoint on his way to work. As he was in age for military service, they took him to a place where he was submitted to medical examination and psychological tests.
During the medical examination, he complained that he had health problems in the clavicle area but according to the doctor he did not provide any medical documents and such injuries do not exempt from military service. The doctor declared that he was healthy and did not propose an ultrasound examination to check his sayings.
At about 11 am, the defendant filed a statement, writing that he refused conscription for mobilization on religious grounds but was ready to perform alternative service. He was warned about criminal liability for draft evasion during mobilization.
From the court documents, it appears that an order of mobilization was issued on the day of his arrest. The defendant signed for receiving a summons but said it was not issued to him. He was told to report at the military enlistment office in Uzhhorod on the next day.
In court, he admitted that he does not want to serve and is not morally ready although he is aware of the duty defined by the Constitution of Ukraine to protect the Motherland. He was never on the military register, he said, and he was never asked to go to the military enlistment office.
According to the certificate issued by the rector of St. George’s Church in the village of Kalyny, Archpriest Ioan Dovbnych, dated 20 January 2023, it appeared that he is a parishioner of St. George’s Church in the village of Kalyny of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). However, Orthodox Churches in Ukraine are not on the list of religious associations the members of which can apply for alternative civilian service in peacetime.
The verdict was appealed to the Transcarpathian Court of Appeal by the prosecutor.
Footnote about the OCU and the UOC
(*) To fully understand this paper, it is important to know the religious, political and geopolitical dimensions of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. In brief, some points of reference.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was established under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople by a unification council convened in Kyiv on 25 December 2018 under the Presidency of Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019). On 5 January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew I, granted a tomos autocephaly (decree of ecclesial independence) to the OCU. The unification council united two Ukrainian Orthodox major jurisdictions: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church/ Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church/ Moscow Patriarchate (UAOC). Two bishops formerly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church/ Moscow Patriarchate (UOC) also joined. Since 2019, the OCU has been incarnating the Ukrainian identity, the political, religious and territorial sovereignty of the country.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) has been historically attached to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and has massively dominated Orthodoxy in Ukraine under the Soviet Union and after the independence of the Ukraine in 1991 until Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, the UOC has modified its status to keep at distance of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Patriarch Kirill without however seceding from it to keep its canonical status. The UOC remains in spiritual communion with the ROC but officially does not pray any more for Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite these steps, the clerics of the UOC are politically perceived in Ukraine as ideological enemies, suspected of collaboration with Russia.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the government and the Parliament of Ukraine are at acute loggerheads with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).