SUDAN : US designates Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist entity. What about Burhan’s role?
The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Burhan’s likely role, place further strain on the codependent relationship
By Willy Fautré, director of Human Rights Without Frontiers
HRWF (18.03.2026) – The designation last week by the United States of Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist entity puts the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, whose links and cooperation with the Muslin Brotherhood are tantamount to co-dependency, in a difficult position.
Indeed, the designation itself poses a question: did General Burhan, with an eye upon his own survival, cut a deal behind the scenes and assist with the designation in exchange for safe passage out of Sudan if needed?
In the designation, the U.S. accuses the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood of receiving support from Iran. The military wing, al-Baraa bin Malik Corps, has received a special mention for its links to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; it was highly visible when the SAF took back Khartoum, and it is generally agreed the SAF could not have recaptured Khartoum without the crucial support of these Islamist forces.
The Islamists loom large in Sudan. Since the fall of ousted president Omar al-Bashir in the popular uprising of 2019, they and their dissolved National Congress Party have fractured into several civilian and military factions. When war broke out in April 2023, they regrouped in new military formations to fight alongside the SAF against the Rapid Support Forces.
General Burhan does not like to admit it, but it is widely recognised that former foreign minister Ali Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, is the true force behind the SAF, bolstered by the Islamist elements within the SAF alliance. The Islamists have a similar grip inside Sudan’s institutions such as the judiciary and public prosecution services, as well as of course the security agencies, intelligence services and military intelligence.
Commentators familiar with Sudan point out that the SAF will likely struggle to implement the requirements of the US designation. It will be challenging to freeze accounts or restrictthe movement of Brotherhood leaders, not least because the Brotherhood’s tentacles are everywhere within Sudan’s institutions
The timing of the U.S. designation was certainly hastened by the conflict with Iran. It was designed to pressure the SAF leadership to cut ties with Islamist militias fighting alongside it, or risk broader sanctions and isolation. And it creates an almost impossible environment for Burhan’s open alignment with Brotherhood-linked forces, increasing his incentive to distance himself rhetorically, reshuffle command structures, or quietly sideline some Islamist figures.However, the SAF still depends on its Islamist fighters for manpower and ideological cohesion, so an abrupt break risks internal fractures or even backlash from hardline Islamists who may feel betrayed.
Most commentators expect manoeuvring from Burhan, rather than a clean break: calibrated distancing in foreign policy language and some symbolic moves against particular militias, while preserving core battlefield cooperation. This means Burhan–Brotherhood ties are likely to grow more contested and transactional, especially under US pressure, but not fully severed unless SAF finds alternative power bases and forces.
The difficulties in Burhan’s codependent relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood will be further exacerbated by questions being asked about Burhan may have quietly helped engineer the Muslim Brotherhood’s designation, working behind the scenes as he faces mounting international scrutiny over SAF atrocities. There has been speculation that he was involved in a discreet deal around the move, effectively securing either a safe exit from Sudan if needed, or protection for himself and his forces from future sanctions. In this reading, Washington gets a high-profile designation at a moment when it is under pressure to confront Iranian proxies as forcefully as possible, while Burhan gains the reassurances he is desperate for. Yet the arrangement appears to be further straining Burhan’s relationship with the Islamist militias, with cracks in that alliance now increasingly visible.
