Sudan: The U.S. was right to move to designate Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood
By Carla Davies
HRWF (26.02.2026) – Late last year, an executive order was signed in the United States directing a review of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters for designation as terrorist organisations. The House Foreign Affairs Committee subsequently approved the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2025, which explicitly includes Sudan. Separately, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Sudanese Islamist actors like Jibril Ibrahim and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade in September 2025 for obstructing peace and collaborating with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Is the terrorist designation justified by the security imperative of confronting a movement that, in Sudan’s case, has a well-documented track record of incubating extremism and prolonging conflict?
The Muslim Brotherhood has been deeply embedded in Sudanese politics for decades. It played a pivotal role in bringing Omar al-Bashir to power through the 1989 coup, and its successors — the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) — governed Sudan for 30 years. After Bashir’s overthrow in 2019, the Brotherhood reorganised covertly and aligned with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), effectively serving as the ideological and organisational backbone of his military regime.
The Muslim Brotherhood is firmly entrenched in the current SAF war effort. Since April 2023, Brotherhood-linked networks have mobilised thousands of former intelligence officers and Islamist cadres to fight alongside the SAF, organising ideologically driven militias such as the al-Bara ibn Malik Battalion.
The Brotherhood’s links to Sudan-based terrorism are both historical and very much contemporary. Under Brotherhood-dominated governance, Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden (1991–1996), was linked to the 1998 US embassy bombings, the 2000 USS Cole attack, and was designated a state sponsor of terrorism for nearly three decades. In the present day, that role continues, with links to Iran and a role in financing Iran’s proxies. Sudan has served as a logistical corridor for Iranian weapons intended for proxies, with Iran also reportedly supplied the SAF itself with explosive attack drones.
There are concerns across a multitude of countries, including European nations, about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The case for targeting the Sudanese branch specifically is even more compelling for the global movement. The Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, operating through SIM and allied militias, has a documented record of state-enabled terrorism, obstruction of democratic transitions, and active participation in the current civil war. Former PM Hamdok’s Samoud alliance has explicitly stated that peace in Sudan is only possible if the Islamist movement is “weakened, isolated, and punished”.
Ideologically, the Brotherhood is one of the core currents behind Sudanese Islamism. They helped to design the institutional architecture of the Bashir era, including within the army and security services. Organisationally, Brotherhood-linked networks and veterans remain influential within parts of the SAF, intelligence, and associated militias. Politically, the Brotherhood aims preserve or restore an Islamist-leaning state order through its alliance with elements of the SAF.
The Brotherhood is far from being a marginal player in Sudan: their legacy and networks are intricately woven into the SAF and have deep roots back to the old regime, and they are actively involved in the current conflict. Their activity is not always out in the open. They operate through local fronts, former National Islamic Front (NIF) and NCP structures, and security organs rather than as a single, openly branded “Muslim Brotherhood party”.
There can be no doubt that the US designation of Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood is both justified and wise. The Brotherhood’s entrenchment in the SAF war effort, from military operations to security apparatus, is prolonging the conflict, leaving Burhan afraid to even consider the negotiating table. The Sudan crisis is certainly a counterterrorism challenge, with Islamist Movement posing a threat to peace and security across the region. As highlighted by the U.S. Treasury, dangerous alliances between Sudanese Islamist groups and the Iranian regime that could cause regional destabilsation have caused sanctions to be imposed. The U.S. State Department has reported “significant backsliding” in religious freedoms in Sudan since the 2023 war, including attacks on Christian communities linked to Islamist influence. The question now is whether other players such as Europe, where there isgrowing concern over the Muslim Brotherhood but not yet a formal designation for the organisation’s Sudan presence, will follow the U.S. move.
March 4, 2026, 13:00-16:00 (CET)
European Parliament, Room 1A2 (Brussels)
