GEORGIA: Why could Orthodoxy become the state religion in the country?
The Georgian Dream party, which was re-elected in the October parliamentary elections, is considering making Orthodoxy the state religion. Despite the Georgian Orthodox Church’s official rejection, a significant faction of conservative bishops is reportedly pushing for this outcome behind the scenes.
La Croix (02.12.2024) – Beka Mindiashvili is a disappointed man. This elderly Georgian theologian no longer sees many people praying before the iconostasis of Saint George’s Church of Kashveti in the heart of Tbilisi, the capital. The imposing religious edifice, central to his daily life of faith, is gradually emptying out. “Faith and trust in the institution are being severely tested,” he said, dressed entirely in black. The Orthodox Church, a cornerstone of Georgian identity, faces unprecedented political intrusion.
The fate of the Georgian Patriarchate was one of the central issues in the parliamentary elections held on October 26. Accused by several European Union countries of illiberal tendencies—claims it denied—the Georgian Dream party, which won the election with 53.9% of the vote, plans to amend the Constitution to make Orthodoxy the state religion. This would mark a first in the history of Eastern Churches. Never since the Great Schism of 1054 have religion and politics been intertwined to this extent.
Politicization
Standing amidst the books in the shop across from his church, Mindiashvili is unsurprised. “This would allow [the government] to control the Patriarchate and steer it in line with Russia,” he explained. A theology professor who attended seminary and edits the journal Orthodoxy and Modernity (published in Georgian), Mindiashvili noted that every government since Georgia’s independence in 1991 has sought to politicize the church.
But never to this degree. In August, the Catholicos-Patriarch, Ilia II, broke his usual silence—imposed by his advanced age of 91—to issue a rare statement rejecting Georgian Dream’s proposal. Since the 2000s, the church has enjoyed a concordat-like status in Georgia, granting it financial privileges and societal visibility.
However, Ilia II’s opposition does not reflect the balance of power within the church, which is split into two camps. According to sources, only a small group of bishops—five out of 43—support the patriarch. Most of the others aligned with Bishop Shio Mujiri and the Department of Public Affairs, who advocated for a stronger Orthodoxy that was more aligned with the Moscow Patriarchate.
“Russia is attempting to exert ideological influence on the church and, through it, on Georgian society, particularly by exploiting ‘moral issues,’” explained Sopiko Zviadadze, a lecturer at Ilia University and an expert on the Catholicosate.
The post-Ilia II Era
Across Georgia, these conservative bishops promote an anti-Western narrative, which is, however, out of sync with “a society that remains overwhelmingly pro-European,” the researcher noted. The reasons for closer ties with the Moscow Patriarchate are never made public. “The Georgian Church is autocephalous, so these links between Russian and Georgian hierarchs remain unofficial,” she added.
Currently, Georgian Dream’s parliamentary majority does not grant it the 75% of seats required for constitutional amendments. “We will convince other MPs. We simply want the Church to have an expanded role,” insisted a senior party member.
Opponents of the proposal fear what might happen after Ilia II’s tenure once he becomes too frail or passes away. The faction led by Bishop Mujiri, who holds the title of locum tenens (interim patriarch), could then easily take control of the church. This might even challenge the Byzantine Orthodox concept of symphony, which envisions mutual respect and complementarity between church and state.